TRACE THE
FAILURE
AVIATION FAILURE

Same airplane. Same fault.
Opposite endings.

On October 28, 2018, a crew stopped a Lion Air 737 MAX from repeatedly trimming its own nose down and landed safely. The next morning the same airplane crashed as Flight 610. Indonesia's KNKT traced why: a mis-calibrated sensor, a warning that never reached the next crew, and a flight-control system that relied on one sensor and was not described in the pilots' manuals.

Follow the evidence
Illustrative AI image of an unbranded white airliner with a red tail flying at night above city lights and a moonlit coastline; not a photograph of PK-LQP.
Illustrative AI image from the episode's reconstruction footage; not a photograph or recording of Lion Air Flight 610 or the aircraft PK-LQP.
THE COMPANION FILMThe System That Forced a Brand New Boeing Into the Ocean Watch episode 5:03

Why did Lion Air Flight 610 crash?

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) registered PK-LQP, crashed into the sea off Tanjung Karawang, West Java, about twelve minutes after leaving Jakarta. All 189 people on board died: eight crew and 181 passengers. KNKT final report, synopsis and §1.2, PDF pp. 20 and 30.

The previous evening, the same airplane had flown from Denpasar, Bali, to Jakarta with the same fault. Its crew stopped the repeated automatic nose-down trim with the stabilizer trim cutout switches and landed. Indonesia’s investigation agency, KNKT, traced why the outcome was different the next morning: a replacement angle-of-attack sensor that was 21 degrees off, information that never reached the next crew, and an automatic system, MCAS, that relied on that single sensor and was not described in the pilots’ manuals or training. KNKT synopsis, PDF p. 20; contributing factors, PDF p. 217.

Watch the Lion Air 610 investigation

The companion episode follows both flights, the sensor error and MCAS in sequence, using simplified technical animations and clearly illustrative scenes.

Watch “The System That Forced a Brand New Boeing Into the Ocean” on YouTube.

A replacement sensor that read 21 degrees off

The trouble began on October 26, when speed and altitude flags appeared on the captain’s display on a flight from Tianjin, China, to Manado, Indonesia. After the problems recurred, the left angle-of-attack sensor was replaced in Denpasar on October 28. That sensor measures the angle between the wing and the oncoming air. KNKT synopsis, PDF p. 20.

The replacement had been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair, and it carried a 21° bias. The investigation could not determine that the installation test had been performed properly, and the error went undetected. On the evening flight to Jakarta, the captain’s control column shook throughout the flight with a stall warning, and the automatic trim repeatedly pushed the nose down. KNKT contributing factors 6 and 7, PDF p. 217; synopsis, PDF p. 20.

The warning that didn’t pass on

After landing, the crew wrote in the aircraft’s flight and maintenance log: “IAS and ALT Disagree shown after take-off” and “FEEL DIFF PRESS light illuminated”. Engineers in Jakarta worked on those reports and the tests passed. KNKT §1.6, PDF p. 38.

Two things were not recorded: the stick shaker that ran for the whole flight, and the use of the runaway stabilizer procedure and its cutout switches. A third clue could not appear at all. The AOA DISAGREE alert, meant to show when the two angle-of-attack sensors disagree, had not been correctly enabled during the 737 MAX’s development. The faulty sensor stayed on the airplane. KNKT contributing factors 5 and 8, PDF p. 217; analysis, PDF p. 180.

On Flight 610, the same problems returned soon after takeoff. The crew worked the airspeed-disagree checklist while repeatedly countering the automatic nose-down trim with their own trim switches and handling numerous air traffic control communications. KNKT found the multiple alerts, repeated activations and distractions were not effectively managed, and that the crew did not identify a runaway stabilizer. It listed this among nine contributing factors, alongside design, certification and maintenance. KNKT synopsis, PDF p. 20; contributing factor 9, PDF p. 217.

What was pushing the nose down?

The system was MCAS, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Boeing added it to the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics in manual flight with the flaps up and at elevated angles of attack. When MCAS sensed a high angle, it trimmed the nose down. KNKT synopsis, PDF p. 20.

KNKT found that MCAS relied on a single angle-of-attack sensor, which made it vulnerable to an erroneous input from that sensor. During design and certification, assumptions were made about how pilots would respond to such a malfunction. They were consistent with industry guidelines, but they turned out to be incorrect. There was no guidance on MCAS in the flight manuals or flight-crew training. In the original design, a pilot’s electric trim input could reset MCAS, allowing it to command again. KNKT contributing factors 1–4, PDF p. 217; FAA summary, p. 11.

What changed after Lion Air 610

On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, another 737 MAX, crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa. On March 13, the FAA issued an emergency order grounding the 737 MAX. FAA summary, pp. 7–8.

The FAA’s November 18, 2020 return-to-service review describes the MCAS changes:

  • Both sensors: MCAS does not use an angle-of-attack input that differs from the other sensor by more than 5.5 degrees.
  • One command: a maximum of one nose-down activation per elevated angle-of-attack event, which pilot electric trim cannot reset.
  • Limited authority: a command limit keeps enough elevator control for the pilots to maneuver.

Procedures and pilot training were revised as well. FAA summary, p. 11.

We remember the 189 people on board Lion Air Flight 610.

For another investigation into how a single hidden weakness brought down an airliner, read what tore open Aloha Airlines Flight 243.

Primary sources and visual provenance

  1. KNKT, Final Report KNKT.18.10.35.04, PT Lion Mentari Airlines Boeing 737-8 (MAX) PK-LQP, Tanjung Karawang, 29 October 2018: synopsis, PDF p. 20; casualties, p. 30; maintenance log, p. 38; AOA DISAGREE analysis, p. 180; contributing factors, p. 217. Report PDF.
  2. FAA, Summary of the FAA’s Review of the Boeing 737 MAX: Return to Service (18 November 2020): ET302 and the grounding, pp. 7–8; MCAS changes, p. 11. Report PDF.

The article image and preview thumbnail are illustrative AI images from the episode’s reconstruction footage of an unbranded aircraft; the thumbnail adds editorial typography. Neither is a photograph or recording of Flight 610. The episode uses AI narration and AI-generated illustrative scenes alongside simplified technical animations.