Why did American Airlines Flight 191 crash?
On May 25, 1979, American Airlines Flight 191, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 registered N110AA, took off from Chicago O’Hare for Los Angeles. During rotation the left engine and its pylon separated, went up and over the wing and fell to the runway. All 271 people on board and two people on the ground died. NTSB report AAR-79-17, synopsis and §§1.1–1.2, printed pp. 1–3.
Losing the engine did not bring the airplane down by itself. The crew was already committed to the takeoff, and the DC-10 could fly on its remaining engines. It climbed, reaching 172 knots about nine seconds after liftoff. About 20 seconds after liftoff, 325 feet above the ground and slowing through 159 knots, it began to roll left. It struck the ground 31 seconds after liftoff. NTSB §1.11, printed pp. 4–5; analysis, printed pp. 48, 51.
The investigation found that the separating pylon damaged the left wing’s leading edge and raised the speed at which that wing would stall. The same event cut power to the warnings that would have told the crew. NTSB probable cause, §3.2.
Watch the American 191 investigation
The companion episode follows the separation, the damaged slats and the speed margin in sequence, using simplified technical animations, real NTSB and FAA images and clearly illustrative scenes.
Eight weeks earlier: how the pylon cracked
The pylon is the structure that holds the engine under the wing. McDonnell Douglas’s maintenance procedure removed the engine first and then the pylon. American Airlines had developed its own method to save time: lower the engine and pylon together, supported on a forklift. Carriers were allowed to devise their own procedures, but the NTSB found that this one demanded more precision than anyone had evaluated. NTSB printed pp. 25–30, 60–63; findings 13–17.
The accident pylon was removed and reinstalled this way in Tulsa on March 29 and 30, 1979, about eight weeks before the crash. With the rear attachment released and the front one still connected, the front fitting could act as a pivot. A movement of the forklift could then press the pylon’s aft upper flange against the wing’s clevis. The report found a crescent-shaped mark that matched the clevis, and a crack in the flange that grew in service until the pylon’s aft bulkhead failed on takeoff. The exact movement that caused the damage could not be determined. NTSB printed pp. 12–16, 29–30, 48–51, 61–62; findings 2–5, 11, 15.
What the departing engine tore through
As the pylon tore loose, about three feet of the left wing’s leading edge went with it. That section carried four hydraulic lines and two cables for the left wing’s outboard slats, the movable surfaces on the leading edge that let the wing make lift at low speed. The same break cut both hydraulic routes to that area. NTSB printed pp. 11, 53; finding 8.
The slats had no mechanical lock. Fluid trapped in the lines held them out, so once the lines were cut, the air pushed the left outboard slats back in. The left inboard slats and all the slats on the right wing stayed extended. Most of the flight controls kept working, because two of the three hydraulic systems ran throughout the flight. NTSB printed pp. 42–43, 52–53, 57; findings 7, 8, 22.
The separation also cut wiring. Protection on the number 1 electrical bus isolated it, and power to it was not restored. That bus fed the slat-disagreement warning and the captain’s stall warning, including the airplane’s only stick-shaker motor. The warning computer that still had power did not receive the left wing’s slat positions. NTSB printed pp. 44, 52, 58; findings 6, 21.
Six knots: the speed that was now too slow
The crew handled the emergency as their procedure said: climb out at the engine-out climb speed, V2, which for this takeoff was 153 knots. The flight director’s guidance and the airplane’s flight path were consistent with that procedure. NTSB printed pp. 2, 44–46 (Fig. 14), 53–54; finding 10.
With its outboard slats retracted, the left wing needed more speed than that. The NTSB put its stall speed at about 159 knots, six knots above V2. As the airplane slowed from 172 knots toward 153, the left wing stalled first, lost lift and rolled the airplane left faster than the controls could stop it. The crew could not see the wings from the cockpit, had no electronic warning of the slat mismatch or the stall, and would have felt little or no buffet. NTSB printed pp. 23–24, 53–54; findings 9, 10.
In simulator tests, pilots who kept their speed up could fly the damaged configuration, and some recovered after the roll began. All of them had been briefed on the accident, though, and the NTSB concluded that it was not reasonable to expect Flight 191’s crew to recognize the roll as a stall or to recover from it. NTSB printed pp. 23–24, 54.
What changed after Flight 191
Continental Airlines had already damaged two DC-10 pylons the same way, and McDonnell Douglas knew of the repairs and issued an occurrence notice. The notice did not explain how the damage happened, and the hazard of the combined removal method did not reach the people at American or the FAA who needed it. NTSB printed pp. 64–66; finding 19.
The FAA later required engines and pylons to be removed and reinstalled separately, with inspections after installation. DC-10s received a second stick shaker, and the warning computers were fed the outboard slat positions from both wings. American revised its engine-failure procedure so that crews kept speed already gained above V2, up to V2 + 10. NTSB printed pp. 47, 70–72; FAA Lessons Learned, airworthiness directives 80-03-10 and 80-11-05R1.
The NTSB also found that certification had not considered a structural separation of the engine and pylon and the failures it could set off in other systems at the same time. NTSB printed pp. 57–58; finding 23.
We remember the 273 people who died: the 271 passengers and crew of Flight 191 and two people on the ground.
For another takeoff that could not be stopped, read what tore open Air France 4590’s fuel tank.
Primary sources and visual provenance
- NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report AAR-79-17: American Airlines, Inc., DC-10-10, N110AA, Chicago-O’Hare International Airport, May 25, 1979. Synopsis and history of the flight, printed pp. 1–5; maintenance and slat systems, pp. 8–30, 42–47; analysis, pp. 48–66; findings and probable cause, pp. 67–69; recommendations, pp. 70–72. PDF page numbers are four higher than printed page numbers. Report PDF.
- FAA Lessons Learned: American Airlines Flight 191, McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, N110AA, including the airworthiness directives issued after the accident. FAA page.
The article image and preview thumbnail are illustrative AI images from the episode’s reconstruction; the thumbnail adds editorial typography. Neither is a photograph or recording of Flight 191. The episode uses AI narration and AI-generated illustrative scenes alongside simplified technical animations and real NTSB and FAA images.
