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Apollo 13.
The 65-volt mistake.

The oxygen-tank failure in space followed a chain of compatibility, testing and review problems on the ground.

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THE COMPANION FILM200,000 Miles From Earth With No Power: Apollo 13 Watch episode 3:39

What caused the Apollo 13 oxygen-tank failure?

The Apollo 13 Review Board traced the accident to oxygen tank No. 2 and a chain of damage before launch. During extended ground emptying, heaters were powered by a 65-volt supply. Their protective thermostatic switches could not safely interrupt that voltage; tests showed that the contacts could weld shut, allowing damaging temperatures inside the tank. Review Board, pp. 4-22–4-23 and chapter 5.

The resulting insulation damage left electrical wiring vulnerable. In flight, activation of the tank fans was followed by electrical disturbances and a pressure rise consistent with arcing and combustion inside the oxygen-rich tank. The report separates the measured telemetry from the reconstructed ignition mechanism. Review Board, findings and determinations.

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Follow the heater circuit, protective switches and damaged insulation through the failure chain.

Why 65 volts mattered

The heaters and their protective switches needed to work as a system under both spacecraft and ground conditions. The original specification used 28-volt spacecraft power. A later change called for 65-volt ground power for tank pressurization, but the switch specification was not changed accordingly. Review Board, printed p. 5-2 / PDF p. 168.

That mismatch could remain hidden during normal pressurization because the switches stayed cool and closed. Carrying current through a closed switch is different from interrupting that current. When the thermostat eventually tried to open under the higher voltage, the electrical arc could damage the contacts and weld them together.

Qualification and acceptance tests had not required the switches to cycle under the relevant load. NASA, the spacecraft contractor and the tank supplier all missed the incompatibility. They approved a system whose protective switches had not been adequately tested for the ground-power conditions they would encounter. Review Board, pp. 4-23 and 5-2.

The unusual emptying procedure

Before launch, tank No. 2 did not empty normally. Investigators considered a displaced internal fill-line connection a likely explanation for that difficulty. The response included about eight hours of heater operation, followed during that period by pressure-and-vent cycles to remove the remaining oxygen. Review Board, pp. 4-22–4-23.

During the long heating period, the thermostats needed to interrupt the higher-voltage supply, something they had not previously been required to do under those conditions. Post-accident tests and a review of the recorded voltage showed that they failed to cut power. Tests indicated that heater-tube temperatures could have reached about 1,000°F, enough to seriously damage nearby Teflon insulation. Investigators reconstructed that temperature through testing; it was not measured inside the tank during the ground operation. Review Board, p. 4-23.

Before launch, the discussion focused largely on whether the tank could still be filled and work in space despite a loose tube. The people reviewing it did not adequately recognize the possible damage from extended heating.

From hidden damage to a mission emergency

When the fans were energized in flight, telemetry showed electrical disturbances consistent with short circuits and arcs. Subsequent tests demonstrated that an arc could ignite the wire insulation in the tank’s oxygen environment. The Board concluded that combustion could account for the observed temperature and pressure behavior and the loss of tank integrity. Review Board, chapter 5.

The crew’s return depended on using the lunar module’s resources, conserving consumables and adapting equipment, including carbon-dioxide removal arrangements. The Board describes these recovery decisions separately from the investigation into the tank failure. Review Board, p. 4-48.

Changing the ground-power voltage required checking the protective switches as well as the heaters. A heater can work at a higher voltage even when its thermostat cannot safely interrupt that voltage.

The source record

NASA Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board

June 1970 · Ground detanking: printed pp. 4-22–4-23 / PDF pp. 129–130. Findings: chapter 5, especially PDF pp. 167–172. Recovery: printed p. 4-48 / PDF p. 155. Recommendations: chapter 5.

Research checked September 21, 2026. Illustrative episode images are not primary evidence.